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Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.
The Aggregation Principle and Its Effect on Jurisdiction
in Rule 23 (b) (3) Class Actions
The situation is so tangled and bewildering that I sometimes wonder whether the world would be any worse off if
the class suit device had been left buried in the learned
obscurity of Calvert on Parties to Suits in Equity)
CLAIMING DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP,

FOUR PLAINTIFFS,

owners

of lakefront property in Orwell, Vermont, sought compensatory and
punitive damages on behalf of themselves and approximately 200
others similarly situated for impairment of their property rights
caused by the defendant's alleged pollution of Lake Champlain.
Maintenance of the class action was predicated on subsection (b) (8)
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The initial issue
was whether jurisdiction had been obtained over all the members of
the proposed class where the four named representative plaintiffs
individually met the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement of
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) but a large segment of the unnamed class
purportedly did not. Held: Even though each of the four named
representative plaintiffs satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement, diversity suit could not be maintained as a class action under
Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the absence of a showing that each of the unnamed members of the class
independently satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirements of
2
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
The post-operative phase of the reconstructed Rule 233 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding class actions has witnessed a series of serious complications which have generated criti-

1Z. CHAFES, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200 (1950).
2 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.),

petition for rehearing en bane

denied, 469 F.2d 1040 (2nd Cir. 1972).
3The relevant part of Amended Rule 23 reads:
FED. R Civ. P. 23(a) and (b).

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as a representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-

tative patties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequatcly protect the interest of the class.

(b) Class Action Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1)
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive
(Continued on next page)
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cism and controversy. The former Rule 234 which predicated its
application on a trichotomy of nebulous classifications,' was expressly

abandoned in 1966 by the amended Rule. Despite the broad animating policy objectives and flexible procedures of the new Rule, subsection (b) (8), resembling the former "spurious class action,"' has
been construed, for subject matter jurisdictional purposes, within
the framework of the mystifying classifications of the original Rule.7
Zahn exemplifies the problems and consequences of employing traditional, rigid notions of aggregation, mater-in-controversy and sever-

ability of claims in the application of an innovative and inherently
pliable rule of civil procedure for the redress of group injuries.

(Continued from preceding page)
to the adjudications or subof the interests of the other members not parties
stantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the
that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
court finds
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
4 The pertinent section of old Rule 23 reads as follows'
Rcprcscntation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
itimpracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more,
as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue
or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is
(I) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
E g, "true," "hybrid," and "spurious."
The nature of the asserted right in a subdivision (b) (3) class action is usually "several,"
involving a claim affected by a common question of law and fact and seeking
i.e.,
common relief. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURES: CMvL
§ 559 (1972).
The old "spurious" class action was basically a permissive joinder device. Caution,
however, is advised in analogizing the old "spurious" action to the present (b) (3)
form:
There is no significance to the fact that there are three types of class actions
set out in the new rule, just as there were in the original rule. Thus, any tendency
to suppose that the old names still may be used, although with their definitions
altered, must be rejected. Analogizing the categories in the original rule with the
provisions in the new Rule (23) (b) not only is wrong but can be dangerously
wrong. 1d. at 514-15.
One of the problematic aspects of the revised Rule 23 is the silence of the draftsmen as to
the applicability of the jurisdictional amount statute (28 U.S.C. § 1332) and the aggregationdoctrine in the maintenance of a (b) (3) class action for jurisdictional purposes.
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The course of the present inquiry begins with a consideration of

the current obstacles confronting a diversity (b)

(3) class action

and proceeds toward an analysis of such considerations and the resulting ramifications, Special emphasis is placed on the policy aspects

of the aggregation doctrine, the jurisdictional amount statute (28
U.S.C. § 1332), and the modern class action device, with specific
reference to the problematic condition of the current judicial system.'

Obstacles to Aggregation of Claims in a (h)(3) Class Action:
Preliminary Considerations
JurisdictionalAmount: Aggregation of Claims, Amount in

Controversy, Rule 82
Section 11 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 limited access to
the federal courts to controversies in which the amount involved exceeded $500.1 In 1958, a minimum of $10,000 was established as a
prerequisite to jurisdiction in federal diversity cases. 0 The appli-

cable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), provides that "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy 1' exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest or costs . ...
In determining the matter in controversy and the permissibility
of aggregation, the established rule, commonly referred to as the

"Pinel doctrine," 2 has been that when two or more plaintiffs having
separate and distinct demands unite in a single suit, it is essential
that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount;
but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right

in which they have a common and undivided interest, it is sufficient
if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount., One
of the objectives of the Pinel doctrine was to check the excessive

resort to the federal courts in the days of Swift v. Tyson.' 4 These
8Not

included within the scope of this discussion is the suitability of the class action device
for the specific redress of injuries resulting from environmental pollution. See, e.g. Annot.,
7 A.L.R. FED. 907-10 (1971).
Also outside the confines of this article, although particularly relevant to the aggregation problem in a (b) (3) class action, is the propriety or potential availability of the
ancillary jurisdiction concept as a vehicle to circumvent the strictures of the aggregation
and amount-in-controversy formulae. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Pan-American Life Insurance Co.,
R.R. Co., 279 F.
375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967); contra, Lesch v. Chicago & Eastern Ill.
Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1968); see particularly Judge Timbers' dissent in Zahn, 469 F.2d
1033 (2d Cir. 1972); also note 53 injra.
' 1 Star.
78.
107 2 Star. 415.
11The old term was "matter in dispute." The statutory language was altered in 1911 to its
pretent terminology. Judicial Code of 1911, 36 Stat. 1091,
127 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDE1RAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 555 (1972).
13

Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1915); Clay v. Field, 138 U.S. 464 (1891); Thomson v.
Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, 8 L. Ed. 349 (1830).
14Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv.
684, 704-05 n. 66 (1941). See also Developments in the Law: Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARv,L. REV. 874 (1958).
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theoretical tests for determining the amount in controversy for
federal jurisdiction purposes originated prior to and independently
of the federal class action device. However, the Pinel doctrine of

"no aggregation except" was applied to the original federal class
action in 1939 so as to preclude aggregation of distinct and separate

claims for obtention of diversity jurisdiction in the case of Clark v.
Paul Gray, Inc., 5 wherein permissible aggregation was limited to
16
"true" class actions, i.e., those actions which involved so-called

joint, common, or secondary rights. Such a mechanically strict interpretation of matter-in-controversy, in relation to the nature of the
class action before the court, comported with the compartmentalization-pigeonholing aspects of the old Rule 23. In addition, it purportedly
reduced the federal caseload.

Despite the anticipation of the proponents of the new class action
that the old classification system would incur the ignominious demise

that it rightly deserved and would not be shackled to the youthful

'8
amended Rule 23,11 the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Harris in effect
reaffiliated the class action with the "accursed labels"" and mandated

that parties to a class action would not be allowed to aggregate their
claims in order to establish the required amount in controversy

unless a "joint" or "common" interest could be shown. The Snyder
decision was predicated on three major considerations, which, to

this day, as evidenced by the Zahkn holding, remain as obstacles to
the effective and equitable implementation of the (b) (3) provision
of Rule 23: (1) established judicial interpretation of amount in controversy as precluding aggregation of separate and distinct claims
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction ;20(2) Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (82)21 as a proscription against permitting a change in

306 U.S. 583 (1939). Dissenting Judge Timbers properly distinguishes Clark. Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (2d Cir. 1972).
1 E.g., where aggregation was precluded in a "hybrid" class action, Sturgeon v. Great Lakes
Steel Corp., 143 P.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1944); in a "spurious" action, Central Mexican Light
& Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1940).
17Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 183; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amedrtents of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV.
356, 399-400 (1967); Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J.
1204, 1214 (1966).
sSnyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Fortas, J. dissenting) [hereinafter referred to as
Snyder].
"Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. C-I. L. REV.
's

684, 707 n. 73 (1941).
20Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336. The thrust of the argument was that revision and
adoption of amended Rule 23 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. did not operate to modify the "settled
doctrine" of no-aggregation-except, citing Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1915) and Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
21Rule 82 of the Fed. R. of Civ. P. reads in part:
These rulesshall nor be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue of the actions therein ....
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aggregation practices;" and (3) implied legislative purpose in reenacting the jurisdictional amount statute. 3
In order to appreciate the import of Zahn, it is necessary to
recognize, or at least attempt to perceive, the boundaries and ambience of Snyder. The holding in Snyder was formulated in a situation in which none of the representative plaintiffs before the court
possessed the necessary jurisdictional amount.2' As has been suggested by one commentator, Snyder clearly prevents the use of the

(b) (3) class action in diversity cases in circumstances in which
no member of the class has a claim in excess of $10,000. 5 Another
observer has interpreted the "hollow sound" of Snyder to require
that each individual representative plaintiff must himself have a
demand over $10,000.26 Despite the rather cryptic linguistic con-

struction of Snyder, it would not be entirely unreasonable to engraft
upon that case a strict construction so as to plunge the (b)

(3)

class action onto the type of procrustean bed that the Zahn court
27
has so "reluctantly" supplied. In theory and practice, Zahn has

1934 Congress gave the Supreme Court the power to enact rules of civil procedure for
the federal courts, 28 U.SC. § 2072 (formerly § 723 c), the Rules Enabling Act. In Sibbach v. Wilson, the Court held that such rule-making authority was limited and could not
be exercised "toextend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by statute." 312 U.S. 1, 10
(1941). See also Defy v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
The Rule 82 argument, in effect, maintains that the principle of aggregation comes
within the ambit of jurisdiction which has been traditionally relegated to Congress rather
than to the rule-making power delegated by Congress to the Supreme Court. See, e.g.
Alvarez v. Pan-American Life Insurance Co., 375 F.2d 992, 995 (5th Cir 1967), maintaining that such jurisdiction had not been expanded in such a sub silensio manner. The
assumption of the courts in positing Rule 82 as a proscription against aggregation of disand separate claims is that a change of such a practice is tantamount to a judicial
tinct
distention of subject-matter jurisdiction.
that Congress has, by consistently reenacting
nThe contention here is double-barreled: first,
the jurisdictional amount statute without comment, adopted the circumscribed judicial interpretation of "amount-in-controversy," (albeit in sub silentio fashion?); second, that Congressional enactment of the jurisdictional amount statute was actuated (but it must be noted,
only in part) by the desire tocheck the rising caseload of the Federal courts. See Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338-40 (1969); see also Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of
Claims for Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 60]
22In

(1969).

7AMrs. Snyder's claim, for instance, amounted allegedly to $8,740. If aggregation had been
permitted, the jurisdictional amount of the 4,000-membered class would have presumably
amounted to approximately $1,200,000. The other representative plaintiff in the companion case alleged damages to himself of only $7-81; but, if his claim had been coupled
with the claims of approximately 18,000 other class members, the aggregate amount
would have been in excess of $10,000. See Snyder, v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1969).
25Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 184 See also 3 B.J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACcE,
§ 23.95 (2d ed. 1948) for contention that the distinct claims of the original parties has
to equal or exceed the jurisdictional amount. Contra, Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
53 F.R.D. 430, 432 (D. Vermont 1971), the district court asserting that it felt "bound
by the clear language of the Supreme Court."
"Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rmv. 497 (1969).
2 Indeed, Professor Wright, while suggesting the soundness of Snyder as dubious, observes:

There are indications that it(Snyder] also means that that device cannot be
used in diversity cases save for the extraordinary situation in which every member of the class has a claim in excess of $10,000., though this is not an inevitable
(Continued on next page)
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carried the Snyder rationale and the principle 28of no aggregation to
its logical, and perhaps unwarranted, extreme.
Administrative Burdens
Courts do not operate in vacuums or concern themselves solely
with the application or exposition of legal principles. Oftentimes,
external factors exert noticeable pressure. An influential contextual
factor apparently responsible for the gradual truncation of the (b)
(3) action in federal diversity cases is the onslaught of litigation
to which the federal courts have been subjected." In 1960, before
the revision of Rule 23, former Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke of
30
the crushing burdens and stresses on the federal judicial system.
reTwelve years later, the honorable Chief Justice Warren Burger
ported that the judges of the 11 courts of appeals had experienced
a massive increase in the volume of litigation: from 4,200 appeals
in 1962 to 14,500 appeals in 1972. 31 The Chief Justice stated:
The re-examination of federal jurisdiction to limit its
scope is long overdue, and I hope the Congress will see, as
the legal profession has, that some of the anomalies of
federal jurisdiction must be corrected. 2
The exigencies of the present situation ostensibly indicate that
the impetus is not one of straining to retain jurisdiction, especially
in circumstances where the potential administrative burdens of a
particular case are crushing 33 and reasonable equitable resolution can
(Continued from preceding page)
conclusion and it would aggravate the damaging effect the Snyder decision has
had on an attempt to modernize the law of class actions. Wright, Class Actions,
47 F.R.D. 169, 184 (1969).
See also 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 565 (1972).

28The possibile untenability of the Zahn extension of the Snyder decision is nurtured by the
fact that nowhere in the Snyder opinion can a statement be extracted to reflect precisely
the holding that Zahn espouses. In fact, J. Black's prefatory statement in Snyder seems to
substantiate such an observation:
The issue presented by these two cases is whether separate and distinct
daims presented by and for various claimants in a class action may be added
together to provide the $10,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy. Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333 (1969).
29Consider the following statement:
There is no compelling reason for this court to overturn a settled interpreta[28 U.S.C. § 1332) in order to add to
tion of an important congressional statute
the burdens of an already overloaded federal court system. Id., at 341.
" 0Warren, Address by the Chief Justice of the U.S,, 25 F.R.D. 213 (1960), noting that
there was a backlog of approximately 74,000 cases.
3'Burger, Report on the Problems of the Judiciary, 93 S. Ct. 3, 10 (Supp. 1972).
121d.,
at 12.
DConsider the formidable challenges and potential for ensnarlsment in the following class
actions.
School Districtof Philadelphiav.Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001,
1003 (E.D. Pa. 1967), a suit brought under the anti-trust laws alleging a national conspiracy and involving a class "'purported to encompass . . . all public libraries . . . and

Such
other educational institutions, organized and situated throughout the U.S. * * *'."
libraries and school systems were estimated to aggregate 60,000 in number. Suit was
(Continued on next page)
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be achieved through other channels. 4 In addressing itself to this
particular problem, the Zahn court implicitly justified its application of the aggregation doctrine on a policy basis, alleging that the
court's holding comported with the "underlying purpose" of the jurisdictional amount statute, namely to check the rising caseload in the
federal courts.3 5 The consequence of this development within the
context of the contemporary administration of justice is a peculiar
interplay of policies involving the old doctrines of aggregation and
matter in controversy within the class action domain.
Obstacles to Aggregation of Claims in a (b) (3) Class Action:
Analysis
Re Judicial and Legislative Construction
Irrespective of the decimating effects on the (b) (3)'s potential
in diversity cases for therapeutic36 application, the Zahn decision
affords an auspicious opportunity again to focus attention upon the
trumped-up rationales utilized in restricting the expansivity of the
(b) (3) device. The persistent judicial reliance on the principle that
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) mandates that separate and distinct claims
cannot be aggregated in order to satisfy the minimum jurisdictional
amount precipitates a need to evaluate the strengths of the two bases
upon which such reliance is posited: the first relates to the traditional judicial and legislative constructions of the jurisdictional
amount statute;37 the second concerns the controlling policy considerations underlying the jurisdictional amount statute.
(Continued from preceding page)

dismissed. Although the primary focus of the problem was the absence of common questions of law and fact, the court added: "Additional considerations which constrain us to
deny the maintenance of this suit as a class action ate the difficulties certain to be encountered in its management as a class action." (at 1004). See alto 54 VA. L. REV. 314 (1968).
Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, an action by an odd-lot investor on behalf of himself and approximately 3,750,000 others similarly situated. Despite the Olympian challenges, the court retained jurisdiction. The case has had a protractive day in court, 391
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. N.Y.
1972).
See also Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.RD. 539 (W.D_ Pa. 1971), involving
an action by a credit card holder on his own behalf and others similarly situated, approximately 60,000, for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act.
At this juncture, it is advisable to recall that the Zahn case was brought on behalf of
approximately 200 purported class members.
34See notes 61 and 69, infra.
s Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972). See e.g., Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); also Weithers, Amended Rela 23: A Defendant's Point
of View (SyMposiuM), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 515, 520-23 (1969); and note 29,
sufra.
1 Judge Weinstein, in Dolgow v, Anderson, spoke of this "therapeutic" or "prophylactiC'
potential of the class action device with specific reference to the area of securities regulation and the public interest. The scholarly opinion is noteworthy for its penetrating analysis
and positive orientation toward the class action. 43 F.R.D. 472, 485-88 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
37Snyder V. Harris represents the controlling viewpoint that the settled judicial construction
of amount in controversy will not be overturned in the absence of a compelling reason
and in the light of the consistent congressional reenactment of the statutory language. 394
U.S. 332 (1969).
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5
partially bottomed its decision, wherein
The court in Zahn"

each of the unnamed (b) (3) class members would have to satisfy
independently the $10,000 requirement, on the statutory language of
28 U.S.C. § 1332, at the same time incorporating by reference the

majority's position in Snyder. The present construction of the jurisdictional statute reflects, as discerned by former Justice Fortas in
Snyder," a current failure to appreciate the nature of the jurisdictional statute and the context in which it has developed. The residual

impact of this strict, limited construction, whereby the judiciary
deems itself incapable of reforming the old practices to fit the new
procedural mechanism, is to fossilize the matter-in-controversy requirement 40 and hinder the development of amended Rule 23. Several

observations are pertinent in assessing the contention that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 precludes aggregation. First, the jurisdictional amount re-

quirement is, in its application, a judge-made doctrine, and, as such,
is capable of being redefined and reevaluated by those who have
4
Secondly, the propriety of
previously determined its lineaments.
determining by judicial reevaluation the functional application of

the jurisdictional amount requirement is further reenforced by the
fact that over the years "Congress has never expanded or explained'42
the bare words of these successive jurisdictional amount statutes.
Third, to infer from or find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a particular construction of a particular doctrine generally
' 43
Fourth, an
requires proof of "very persuasive circumstances.
examination of the historical application and development of the

judicially formulated aggregation doctrine for purposes of delineating the matter-in-controversy reveals that the atmosphere was
basically one in which the mechanical tripartite concepts of jural

38"Rather it is dear in the light of Snyder, 394 U.S. at 336, that the critical focus in resolving
the issue before us must be on 28 U.S.C. § 1332." Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469
F.2d 1033, 1035 (2nd Cir. 1972).
3' Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 342 (1969).

40For example, whether the Snyder decision intimates that judicial reinterpretation is possible
cannot be decided without first making a determination as to whether the "compelling
reason" and "consistent congressional reenactment" are conjunctively or disjunctively related to the exception suggested. Id, at 341. Immutability of the ss tute may not necessarily
be the logical import of Snyder.
41 Consider:

4

This Court . . . has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at
self-correction . . . [W]e cannot evade our own responsibility for reconsidering
in the light of further experience . . . the validity of distinctions which this
Court has itself created." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1940).
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 347 (1969).

di Giruard v. U.S., 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946), cited by J. Fortes in Snyder v. Harris, 394

U.S. 332, 348 (1969). See also Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). See
generally Note, Legislative Adoption of Prior Judicial Construction: The Girouard Case
and the Reenactment Rule, 59 HARe. L. REV. 1277 (1946).
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relationships, indigenous to old Rule 23, prevailed 4 and the concomitant emphasis was on rigid pigeon-holing, a cul-de-sac that the
new Rule purposely sought to avoid. Fifth, the contention that Rule
82 presents a barrier to the judicial reformulation of the aggregation concept was disposed of by former Justice Fortas in the following manner:
Making judicial rules for calculating jurisdictional
amount responsive to the new structure of class actions is
not an extension of the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
but a recognition that the procedural framework in which
the courts operate has been changed by a provision [Rule 23]
having the effect of law.15 [Emphasis supplied.]
These considerations seriously undermine the argument that
the jurisdictional amount statute precludes the exercise of judicial
discretion in redefining the amount-in-controversy concept for the
purpose of promoting a "welcomed and long-needed reform in federal
procedure."' 6 An observation, made in 1939 by Justice Frankfurter,
in circumstances militating against adherence to and perpetuation
of a rigid judicial formula, is noteworthy:
Our problem then is not that of rejecting a settled statutory construction. The real problem is whether a principle
shall prevail over its later misapplications."
A dilemma occurs, however, when that principle derives its strength
from the very source that sustains a countervailing principle.
28 U.S.C. 1332: A Conflict In Principles
While the Zahn court found sustenance for its decision from
the traditional statutory construction of 28 U.S.C. § 132, such
fidelity to legal construction did not appear to be the sole inducing
factor. Rather, the argument assumed a distinctly prescriptive tenor
with the vortex clearly nestled in one of the policy considerations of
28 U.S.C. § 1332. The significance of this oblique approach is twofold: first, in view of the present state of the federal judiciary, the
particular policy emphasis may become more conveniently parochial,
resulting in a possible greater reluctance by other federal courts to

"See

Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of jurisdictional
Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L Ruv. 601, 604-05 n. 17 (1969); see also Comment,
Federal Procedure-Class Actions: Amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedre Does Not Permit Aggregating Claims to Achieve the Necessary 'Amount in Controversy" Where Interests are Separate and Distinct- Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969), 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 326, 330 (1969).
4SSnyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 356 (1969).

4id. at 342 (J. Fortas).
41
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 122 (1940).
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admit a subdivision (b) (3) type class action into the embrace of
federal jurisdiction;" secondly, such an approach suggests a peculiarly paradoxical situation in which the very source (28 U.S.C
§ 1332) utilized to promote the policy of limiting the federal caseload can be cited as opposing authority for encouraging the entertainment of class actions presenting significant claims.
Germane to the successive increases in the monetary amount
for diversity jurisdiction is the underlying Congressional intent to
require an amount "not so high as to convert the Federal courts into
courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the
trial of petty controversies."" Inherent in this Congressional statement of purpose is a subtle tension between two equally meritorious
but potentially conflicting policy concerns, both of which 5have
0
quietly surfaced in the presently overburdened judicial system. On
the one hand, the establishment of a minimal jurisdictional amount
represents a practical and self-protective attempt to alleviate the
congestion in the federal courts and secure operational efficiency by
diminishing the federal caseload and limiting accessibility to the
federal forums. The results reached in cases like Zahn and Snyder
theoretically comport with such objectives.1 On the other hand, the
Congressional intent to prevent judicial congestion is implicitly
qualified by the accompanying policy consideration that denial of
jurisdiction is to be limited to "petty controversies." The denial of
access to a federal forum to plaintiffs who collectively present a
significant claim within the form of a class suit is antithetical to
one of the implicit policy concerns of the jurisdictional amount
statute. 52 The concession that those who satisfy the jurisdictional
amount may remain in federal court to vindicate their rights does
not justify the denial to others similarly situated to join with those
who have been permitted to present a commonly shared substantial
controversy.53 In their respective emphases on the desirability of
48A finding of "spuriousness" or severability plus the existence of named or unnamed class

members, unable to satisfy the jurisdictional amount, would facilitate such reluctance.
S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958); 1958 U.S. CODE & CONG. News 3099,
3101
®The Zahn court focused upon the reduction-of-litigation factor and did not address itself

4

to the correlative policy consideration of "petty controversies."

s The 'theoretical" qualification is particularly pertinent here in the Zahn case. If as the
facts suggest, (see, e.g., 53 FRD. 430, 431 (1971) ), there are more than the four

named plaintiffs of the 200-membered class who satisfy the jurisdictional amount, then
the possibility of duplicate litigation in the federal courts on a similar issue is not remote,
despite the availability of joinder.
5 The situation in Zahn and Snyder certainly cannot be flippantly categori2ed as petty.
" This practice, more common in cases involving the reciprocally related theory of pendent
jurisdiction, is oftentimes referred to as "riding on another's coat-tails" theory. See note 8,
supra.
See partitelady Judge Timbers' focus on the ancillary jurisdiction concept. Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036-38 (2d Cir. 1972). Further distension, however, of the slowly evolving ancillary jurisdiction concept so as to protectively cloak the
(b) (3) subsection of the revised class action would be advisably unnecessary were it not
for the draconian interpretationand application of the Snyder holding.
MId. at 1160.
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affording equitable opportunity to litigate significant claims, the
jurisdictional amount statute and the class action device are complementary. The sobering reality, however, is that the present judicial
system is neither particularly disposed nor equipped to entertain "the
broadest scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties ..
Ramifications of the Zabn Rationale
The "Small Fellow" and the Open Forum
The class action was an invention of equity * * *
mothered by the practical necessity of providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large
groups of individuals, united in interest, from enforcing
their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from equitable wrongs .... 11
The recognition that individuals making up a group are usually
"in no position to act for themselves because of their lack of knowledge and the disproportion between the expense of seeking redress
and their individual stake in the controversy"'" was one of the
motivational factors that prompted a revision of the old Rule 23.
At the time of revision, the new Rule was viewed as an attempt to
provide a vehicle for redressing injuries to a large number of persons, who as individuals would be without effective strength to
bring into the courts those who had impaired their rights or caused
them injury. 7 This observation is substantiated by the Advisory Committee's Notes on the desirability and function of a (b) (3) class
suit:
The interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call for a denial of a class
action. On the other hand, these interests may be theoretic
rather than practical: the class may have a high degree of
cohesion and prosecution of the action through representatives would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at
stake may be so small that separate lawsuits would be
impracticable.'" [Emphasis supplied.]

"Under the Rules . . .joinder of daims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged."
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). Although the
statement was made in reference ro the suggested breadth of pendent jurisdiction in federal
question cases, the reason and policy underlying the standard advocated are no less significant to the issue of entertaining federal jurisdiction in class actions.
"Montgomery Ward & Co. v- I-anger, 168 F-2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
56Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cn.L.REv.
684,714 (1941).
57
Eisen v.Carlisle
& Jacqueline, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968); See Kaplan, a Prefatory
Note, 10 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 497 (1969); Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device For
Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B. C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 501, 504 (1969).
58Advisory Committee's Notes, for Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 104 (1966).
'
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To hold, as the Snyder rationale did, that separate and distinct
claims may not be aggregated (presumably by those representative
plaintiffs before the court) in a "spurious-type" class suit for diversity
purposes certainly handicapped the viability of the (b) (3) class
action.59 But Zahn's extension of Snyder to the point of precluding
a (b) (3) diversity class action except in the extraordinary situation in which every member of the class satisfies the $10,000 jurisdictional amount contravenes one of the salient features of the reconstructed class action. The consequence is that accessibility to a
federal forum for (b) (3) class action purposes is restricted to a
very select and perhaps non-existent group.6 0 Furthermore, in response to the argument that such claims can be adjudicated just as
effectively in a state forum, the following has been contended:
The notion that the litigants are free to pursue their
rights in a state court may not always be realistic if the
state procedural system tends to discourage class actions or
if the individual claims are so small that the class members
are remitted to a small claims court or a court of limited
jurisdiction that is not authorized to hear class actions.61
Judicial Economy, Mince Pie, and Equity
The Advisory Committee's Notes, in adumbrating the advantages
of a (b) (3) class suit, explained:
Subdivision (b) (3) encompasses those cases in which
a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or
bringing about other undesirable results. 2
The beneficiaries of this economy principle are the parties themselves and the judicial system. The thrust of the policy is broader
in scope than the parochial aspect of the federal jurisdictional
amount statute yet complementary to its component policy objective. The primary concern is to prevent multiplicity of litigation
within the judicial framework or, as one observer stated,

".

.

. to

reduce units of litigation by bringing under one umbrella what
"...63
might otherwise be many separate but duplicating actions .
from
him
protects
action
class
the
adversary,
With regard to the
" See, note 67, in fra.

60For a good discussion of the preferability in promoting group redress of group injuries

as opposed to private enforcement, see Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary FPnction of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 71.4-20 (1941).
617 WRIG4T & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1756, at 561 (1972);
see also Zahn v.International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d. Cir. 1972).
62
Advisory Commiuee'r Noter, for Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98,103-04 (1966).
' 3 Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497 (1969).
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unnecessary vexation and expense." Professor Chafee, in discussing
the equitable nature of representative class suits and their distinctive capacity to avoid inconvenient, multiple, and uneconomical
litigation, opined that the adversary is safeguarded from the danger
that the aggregate of the separate jury verdicts might exceed the
lImit of his liability, such fund or limited liability being ". . . like
a mince pie, which cannot be satisfactorily divided until the carver
counts the number of persons at the table."'" In addition, the class
action, by focusing upon a number of common controversies in one
litigable unit, promotes uniformity of decision as to persons simi-

larly situated. The Zahn holding creates the risk of multiple litigation, economic hardship for the redress of individual injuries, and
divergent adjudications regarding an issue with common questions
of law and fact.
Correlatively, the economy principle is designed to benefit the
judicial system as a whole. The catholic viewpoint of Rule 23 is

particularly significant in view of the sky-rocketing caseloads of
the state judiciaries. 6 The denial of a federal forum in a situation
comparable to the facts in Zahn may result in the undesirable and

uneconomical dissipation of state judicial energies and resources in
the event that the class members seek to redress their injuries individually or multiply.
Conclusions

The result reached in Zahn is responsive to the plea of limiting the scope of federal jurisdiction in a period of intense judicial
stress. Adherence to the principle espoused in Zahn will not totally
vitiate the class action device, or even subsection (b) (8), for that
matter. The import of the holding, for example, would not affect
64An indiscriminate use of the class action device, however, may have severely detrimental

effects on the defendants. See Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View,
10 B. C. INn. & Com. L. REV. 515, 521-26 (1969).
65Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 169 (1950).
66Consider, for example, the plight of the Florida judiciary. The Florida circuit courts in
1970, while purportedly disposing of approximately 120,000 cases, were 13,000 cases behind. The Florida supreme Court level was then projected to reach a record of 1,500 cases
in 1971 or 50% more than the so-called "crisis year" of 1952. The cases deposited in the
Florida district courts produced an amount that averaged in 1970 more than 300 cases per
judge. See Roberts, The State of the Judiciary, 45 FLA. B.J. 394 (July 1971).
The Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in cataloguing the
problems besetting that state's judiciary, reported:
Each Supteme Judicial Court justice now must write more than fifty opinions
per year in contrast with approximately twenty to twenty-thrce opinions per
judge in New York, New Jersey, North Carolina and California and even less in
Louisiana and North Dakota. The figure is nearly double the national median.
In addition each justice must familiarize himself with two hundred or more other
cases ....
Tauro, The State of the Judiciary, 56 MASS. L.Q. 207, 236 n. 13 (1971).
See also Don Vito, An Experiment in the Use of Court Statistics, 56 JUDICATURE 56
(Aug.-Sept. 1972) re backlogs of criminal cases in major metropolitan judiciaries.
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securities fraud cases or those dealing with federal questions in
which no minimum monetary amount is required. The already extraordinary development of Rule 23 in civil rights, anti-trust, secur-

67
ities, consumer, and mass tort cases will not necessarily be stunted.
have
will
But, as noted previously, adherence to the Zahn rationale
a debilitating effect on one of the essential purposes of the new Rule

to enable a court to determine the rights and claims of a class
of similarly situated and commonly affected individuals, including
small claimants, by one common final judgment through a device
-

which promotes the efficient and convenient presentation of a substantial controversy worthy of adjudication.
The holding in Zahn is undesirable in a number of respects.
First, the expansion of the Snyder decision appears to have been
unnecessary in view of the particular factual situation. If, as the
facts suggest, the court could not find an appropriate class or any

advantage in maintaining the suit as a class action,' then these two
considerations would have been sufficient under the new Rule to
deny class action status.69 Convenience, desirability, flexibility, and0

judicial discretion are integral components of subdivision (b) (3).7
Second, whether the reduction of the federal caseload will be justi71
fiably facilitated is questionable at this time. Third, from the stand-

point of over-all judicial economy, the practical effect of the holding, while possibly serving the interests of the federal judiciary, is
to foster a potentially considerable amount of duplicate litigation.

§ 1753, at 541 n. 45
(1972). See, for example, Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED. 461-502 (1971); Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED.
415-451 (1971); Annot., 7 A.L.R. FED. 907-910 (1971).
5
8See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt. 1971); 469 F.2d 1033,
1039 (2d Cir. 1972).
69A number of alternatives are available upon dismissal of class action: joinder, consolidation, intervention, resort to administrative agency, and possible class action in state forum.
But see Sabbey, Rule 23: Categoriesof Subsection (b), 10 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. RaV. 539,
553-54 (1968) as to possible impracticability of such alternatives. It has also been suggested that the split trial device might be effective in the administration of (b) (3) actions.
The commentator however does not subscribe to the theory that aggregation is or should
be permissible in (b) (3) actions. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning
Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39.
7'Advisory Committee's Notes, for Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-104
677 WRIU1T & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CVIL

(1966).

71"It is true that, in practice, the bulk of class actions lodged in federal courts are based on
jurisdictional statutes in which amount in controversy plays no part." Kaplan, A Prefatory
Note, 10 B. C. IND, & COM, L. REV, 497, 498 (1969).
Consider also the following observation:
Almost all of the actions sought to be maintained as class actions under
Subsection (b) (3) since the amendment of F. R. Civ. Procedure 23 in 1966
have alleged either securities frauds or anti-trust violations. Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp. 53 F.R.D. 539, 541 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
See also Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part II, 36. U.
Cas. L. Ray. 268, 297 (1969), author advising abolishment of jurisdictional amount requirement in view of the alleged draining of judicial resources which the requirement has
produced.
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Fourth, in view of the possible limited scope of Snyder and the
critical dissatisfaction that it has caused, the foundation for the
court's extension of the aggregation doctrine so as to preclude maintenance of a (b) (3) action except in circumstances in which every
class member possesses the requisite jurisdictional amount will certainly be subject to careful examination. 2
The new Rule 23 purportedly represented a significant departure
from the philosophy and conceptualistic orientation of the old Rule.3
The old tripartite classification of juristic relationships, utilized under
the old Rule primarily to determine the binding effect of the class
action judgment on outsiders, was abandoned as the effect-of-judgment issue was resolved by subsection (c) of the new Rule. The
formidable complexity and obscurity of the old categories were recognized to be the insidious defects of the old Rule.'4 Yet the five
post-operative years have witnessed the commission of the same
errors which were indigenous to the old Rule. Both Snyder and
Zahn categorize the interests of the class members and thereby
cement the new Rule in the old traditions and pitfalls. By focusing
on the identity rather than on the solidarity of interests, whether
for purpose of determining jurisdictional amount or maintenance of
a suit as a class action, the problem of fashioning an effective group
remedy becomes an increasingly difficult task. The old classifications
do not and were not intended to coincide with the new." The present
dilemma and controversy suggest a crucial need to re-examine the
tendency toward resorting to and perpetuating the old trichotomy
of classifications which sclerosed the original Rule. The persistenly
problematic position of the revised Rule and the need for flexible,
responsive judicial procedures must be reckoned with, either by the
judiciary or the legislature. At the same time, it must be recognized

"t There

is an intimation that separate questions as to the incurrence of damages by the plaintiffs would justify dismissal in view of the possible administrative burdens. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 434 (D. Vt. 1971); 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir.
1972). It has been recognised, however, that the factor of computation of damages alone
does not justify dismissal where the prerequisites to the maintenance of a class action are
met and manageability is not an impossibility. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 391 F.2d
555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968). A separate consideration of damages can be ordered.

7 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL

§ 1752, at 515 (1972).

74See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 245, 246 (1950); Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendmesnts of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Si1
HARV. L. REV. 356, 376-400 (1967); See also Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested
Revision of Rule 23, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 822 (1946); Kalven and Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Scit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 707 (1941); Ford, The
History and Developmnet of Old Rule 23 and the Development of Amended Rule 23, 32
ANTITRUST L.J. 254 (1966).
757 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1752, at 514 (1972).
See alto note 6, supra.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973

15

1973]

ZAHN V. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.

that the conflict between the equitable demands of the class action
and the pragmatic dictates of the over-taxed judiciaries are not
necessarily incapable of harmonization. Resolution of that conflict
is peculiarly within the Congressional domain.7 6
Zygmont A. Pinest

' 6 The Judicial Conference of the U.S., the policy making body of the Federal Judiciary, for
instance, voted to recommend to Congress the creation of 62 more federal judgeships and
340 additional probation officers. New York Times, Oct. 29, 1972, at 20, col. 5.
t Law Review Candidate, second year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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